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Cognitive models assume a one-to-one correspondence 
between task and goals. We argue that modeling a task by 
combining multiple goals has several advantages: a task can 
be constructed from components that are reused from other 
tasks, and it enables modeling thought processes that compete 
with or support regular task performance. To achieve this, we 
updated the PRIMs architecture (a derivative of ACT-R) with 
the capacity for parallel goals that have different activation 
levels. We use this extension to model visual distraction in 
two experiments. The model provides explanations for the 
finding that distraction increases with task difficulty in a 
memory task, but decreases with task difficulty in a visual 
search task.  
Keywords: Cognitive Control, Task representation, PRIMs, 
Distraction, Multitasking 
Introduction 
Whenever we are faced with something new to learn or to 
do, we can rely on a vast array of skills and knowledge. 
Given what we usually call a task, we need to recruit the 
right procedural and declarative knowledge and find the best 
way to piece this knowledge together, and, if necessary 
expand it with the missing pieces. One might think this 
challenge should be a centerpiece in the cognitive modeling 
and cognitive architecture research tradition, but 
unfortunately it isn't.  
In almost all flavors of cognitive modeling, whether 
symbolic, hybrid or connectionist, it is tacitly assumed that 
there is a one-to-one relationship between tasks and goals. 
In this context, we consider a goal to be an internal 
representation that is used to recruit the appropriate 
knowledge to achieve that goal. Most models model just use 
a single task and a single goal, and all the knowledge 
incorporated in or acquired by the model is just for that task. 
The one-task-one-goal approach puts many restrictions on 
what can be achieved by cognitive modeling. It ignores the 
question how goals are set, prioritized and abandoned. It 
cannot answers questions about what other things people are 
thinking about when they carry out a task, which might 
affect the task either positively or negatively. For instance, 
metacognitive planning ahead may have a positive effect on 
performance, whereas distraction may have a negative 
effect. But distraction may be a positive influence if it 
prevents us from pursuing a hopeless goal.  
An alternative for the one-task-one-goal approach is to 
have several active goals to support a single task. The 
traditional method of doing this is through subgoaling. In 
particular the Soar cognitive architecture has pursued the 
idea that a new task or goal can use several subgoals that 
have already been learned as part of other tasks (Laird, 
Rosenbloom, & Newell, 1986). Unfortunately, in most Soar 
models subgoals were specifically designed for a specific 
main goal. Moreover, the goal stack is now considered by 
many as a too rigid representation, because typically only a 
single goal in the hierarchy is active (Anderson & Douglass, 
2001), while in reality goals typically compete with each 
other (i.e. calling while driving).  
An alternative for a goal hierarchy is to have several goals 
active at the same time, as for example implemented in the 
threaded cognition extension to ACT-R (Salvucci & 
Taatgen, 2008). Threaded cognition, however, has mainly 
been used to model multi-tasking, so although a model 
would have multiple tasks and multiple goals, there was still 
a one-to-one mapping between tasks and goals (with some 
exceptions, e.g., Taatgen, Juvina, Schipper, Borst, & 
Martens, 2009).  
Another effort to break the monolithic goal structure is 
the PRIMs (Primitive information processing elements) 
theory, another extension to ACT-R (Taatgen, 2013). 
PRIMS allows us to go beyond the original tasks by 
breaking down task-specific rules into combinations of 
primitive information processing elements that in 
themselves are task-general. Learning a new task involves 
combining those primitive elements into task-specific rules, 
but the byproduct of the learning trajectory is that the model 
also learns task-general rules that it can use for other 
purposes. This means that PRIMs can model knowledge 
transfer from one task to another. A limitation of PRIMs is 
that task knowledge is still specified in terms of task-
specific operators that are linked to a single goal. 
Altmann and Gray (2008) explore a different aspect of 
goals: the current goal is not set by production actions, as is 
the case in most models, but the goal with the highest 
activation determines the actions. Their goal representations 
are susceptible to decay, and therefore the reaction times for 
a particular goal gradually increase as subjects continue 
doing the same task. Rehearsal processes can influence goal 
activations, which is the primary process to control what the 
current goal is. Still, at any moment a single goal is active 
for a single task. 
In this paper we will combine these three approaches as 
part of a new version of PRIMs (PRIMs 2.0), in which a 
single task is implemented by multiple goals. These goals 
are specified in such a way that they are can be reused for 
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other tasks, and have associated activation levels that 
determine which goal is most influential at a certain 
moment. We will then use this to build a model of 
distraction. Distraction, or self-interruption, is a major 
problem in our information society, because regular work 
progress is threatened by email-checking and Facebook 
updating. It is therefore of importance what factors 
influence self-interruption, which may enable us to find 
ways to mitigate or control it. First, we will explain the new 
version of PRIMs in detail.  
The PRIMs 2.0 goal representation 
As an example to illustrate the goal representation we will 
use part of a task that we will use later on: solving simple 
equations. The task of solving an equation like 5x + 2 = 12 
is represented by four parallel goals: reading the equation 
into working memory, transforming the equation, doing 
arithmetic, and giving the answer (Figure 1). The four goals 
are not carried out in parallel, of course, but their 
representations are all active. Active goals spread activation 
to operators in memory that can carry out that goal. 
Operators are the declarative counterpart of production 
rules, so they have conditions that are tested, and actions 
that are carried out when the conditions are satisfied (see 
Taatgen, 2013, for details). When solving an equation, first 
operators are retrieved that are associated with the reading 
goal, because there is no mental representation of the 
equation yet. Once there is a representation, operators 
associated with the transformation and arithmetic goals 
alternate in solving the equation, until the answer goal can 
key in the answer.  
In this example all four goals are active throughout 
problem solving, and the conditions of the operators ensure 
that they are carried out in the right order. This is not always 
possible, so sometimes goals have to be added or removed. 
However, this requires a particular control strategy, which 
makes learning harder. 
Ultimately, goals only influence the activation of 
operators. This means that a goal doesn't guarantee a 
matching operator is selected, it only makes it more likely. 
Other factors can influence the retrieval of operators, 
though, for example external stimuli or the content of 
particular declarative retrievals. It is therefore possible that 
an operator is retrieved that has nothing to do with the 
current goals, leading to distractions. As we will see later 
on, it is in between operators for different goals that 
distractions have an opportunity to intervene. 
Key Principles 
The key principles of the PRIMs 2.0 goal representation are 
as follows: 
Goals are carried out by operators that are associated 
with that goal. This is of course true for almost any 
symbolic architecture, but uniquely in PRIMs multiple 
goals can be active, and operators can also be associated 
with multiple goals. Operators do not refer directly to 
goals or vice versa, there are connected through strength 
of association only. 
Goals have an activation value that is susceptible to all 
ACT-R memory processes. As a consequence, not all 
goals are equal, and the goal with the highest activation 
has a higher probability of recruiting operators it needs.  
The activation value of a goal determines how much 
activation it spreads. All active goals are stored in slots 
in ACT-R's goal buffer. This means that they are sources 
of spreading activation. However, instead of the standard 
spreading activation of W/n, as is in regular ACT-R, the 
Wj of a goal is equal to its activation. This means that 
operators that are associated with a certain goal receive 





Figure 1. Illustration of how operators associated with 
different goals together solve an equation 
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The most active operator whose conditions are satisfied is 
carried out. This is not necessarily an operator for the 
most active goal, because it may have no operators that 
currently match. Moreover, other influences can add 
activation to operators to influence the selection, in 
particular spreading activation from other sources 
(perception, working memory, memory retrieval, etc.). 
Activation of a goal can be increased by explicitly 
retrieving it (possibly repeatedly). Retrieval is a 
deliberate strategy to influence the priority of goals. 
Increased influence can be achieved by multiple 
retrievals (rehearsal, cf. Altmann & Trafton, 2002). 
Activation of a goal decays over time. This means that if 
goals aren't maintained, or reinforced in any other way, 
they decay and disappear. 
Operators associated with the same goal are also 
associated with each other. This makes it more likely 
that an operator for the same goal as the previous 
operator is chosen. 
To demonstrate the power of this approach, we will use it 
to model a distraction experiment. 
 Experiment 
The main idea of the experiment is that subjects had to carry 
out different tasks of varying difficulty level. While they 
carried out the task, a video played at the other side of the 
screen. The video was unrelated to the task. The extent to 
which subjects in the experiment were distracted by the 
video was measured with an eye tracker. 
The experiment involved two different tasks, one focusing 
on mental operations, and the other on visual operations. 
Each had three different levels of difficulty. In the memory 
game, subjects played the game of Memory or 
Concentration with cards with equations instead of pictures. 
Sixteen cards were displayed on the screen. Subjects had to 
click on the cards, which would reveal the equation on the 
back. Clicking on two consecutive cards with the same 
solution to the equation would remove them, with the 
eventual goal of removing all sixteen cards (Katidioti, Borst, 
& Taatgen, 2014). There were three levels of difficulty: the 
easiest level had equations of the form 4 + 2 = x, basically 
simple arithmetic. Medium level equations were of the form 
x + 4 = 16, requiring a transformation followed by 
arithmetic, and hard question had the form 5x + 2 = 12, as 
illustrated in Fig. 1, requiring several operations to solve. 
Figure 2 shows a screen-shot of the experiment. 
 
Figure 3. Example of the find-the-differences game in the 
medium condition, just after feedback. 
 
In find-the-differences game, subjects were presented with 
two pictures on the top and bottom of the screen that each 
consisted of a number of random shapes (colored ovals and 
rectangles). Both pictures were identical except for one 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of the memory game on the left, and the movie on the right. The memory game is in the medium 
condition, and two of the cards have already been matched. 
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small difference in one of the shapes (Figure 3). The task 
was to find the difference, and click on it. In the easy 
condition, each picture consisted of 2-4 shapes, in the 
medium condition 15-17 shapes, and in the hard condition 
40-42 shapes. Like in the memory game, a movie that was 
unrelated to the task also played at the other side of the 
screen. 
Subjects in the experiment either did the find-the-
differences game or the memory game (25 participants per 
task). They performed one of the tasks for 15 minutes at 
each level of difficulty, for a total of 45 minutes. 
Our theory about choice in multitasking is that people 
tend to switch to another task if that task needs resources 
that are not currently used by the present task. In the 
experiment, the distraction requires use of the visual 
resource, so the prediction is that if the main task needs 
fewer visual resources, the frequency of distractions by the 
video will be higher. We therefore predict that the frequency 
of distraction increases with difficulty for the memory 
game, because solving an equation temporarily requires 
fewer visual resources, which are then free to move to the 
video. In contrast, distraction decreases with difficulty for 
the find-the-differences game, because visual resources are 




Figure 4. Results of the experiment. Error bars represent 1 
standard error. 
 
Figure 4 shows the mean number of distractions (i.e., eye-
movements to the video) per subject in each of the 15 
minutes blocks of playing either game (distractions between 
games were removed). The effect of the level of difficulty 
on the number of distractions is highly significant: when we 
fit generalized linear mixed effect models based on a 
Poisson distribution to the data, all differences between 
different levels of difficulty are significant with p values 
less than 0.001.  
To conclude, the experimental results support the theory 
that distraction increases if the resources that are available 
match the resources that the distraction requires (in this case 
visual resources). We have similar, although weaker, 
evidence that this is also the case for working memory, 
where subjects tended to switch to a secondary task 
involving memory more often at moments that the memory 
requirements of the main task had just decreased (Katidioti 
et al., 2014). The next challenge is to construct a model that 
reproduces this behavior. 
A Model of Distraction 
In the new PRIMs 2.0 representation, tasks are represented 
by multiple goals. However, these goals only spread 
activation to applicable operators, so they do not enforce 
that only task-relevant operators are chosen. This means that 
at any point an operator can be retrieved that is not related 
to the task, assuming that operator has a high enough 
activation. In our case, the video is a perceptual input that is 
associated with operators that propose to attend the video. A 
condition of these operators is that the visual resource is 
available. 
A model of the memory game 
For simplicity, we have not constructed a model that plays 
the whole game, but a model that just solves equations of 
varying difficulty. We think that this partial model captures 
the essential characteristics of the task as a whole. Figure 1 
already gave a clear representation of the structure of the 
model: the task is represented by four goals, read, transform, 
arithmetic and answer. Each of these goals has a small set of 
associated operators that implement that goal. The hard 
equations require the sequence as it is shown in Figure 1, 
involving 12 operators. The medium and easy equations use 
the same operators, but omit some of them: the medium 
equations skip the second transform and arithmetic 
sequence, and therefore only require 8 operators. The easy 
equations require no transformations, just the final 
arithmetic, and one fewer read operator, so a total of 5 
operators.  
In addition to the task-related operators, the model has 
two operators that respond to the distraction. The first of 
these has as a condition that the visual resource is not used, 
and moves attention to the video. The second operator 
activates at the moment that the video is attended, and 
disengages immediately. This reflects the empirical fact that 
in the experiment, subjects typically attended the video for 
only 200-400ms.  
Most of the time, the distraction operators do not have 
much of a chance to intervene in the equation solving 
process. When reading operators are engaged they have no 
chance at all, because the visual resource is in use, whereas 
a condition of distraction is that the visual resource is free. 
Whenever the model transitions between an operator for a 
















Distractions in 15 minutes (data)
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way around), however, distraction has a small probability of 
winning the competition due to activation noise.  
The model can explain the data, because the distraction 
operator only competes when the model is not reading the 
equation (which takes proportionally more time as the 
equation is easier), and because in the harder conditions the 
model switches more often between transformation and 
arithmetic, providing more opportunities for distraction.  
A model of the find-the-differences game 
The model of find-the-differences is relatively simple. It 
consists of three goals: a search goal that attends an 
unattended feature in the top picture, a compare goal that, 
given an attended feature in the top picture, finds the 
corresponding location in the bottom picture, and then 
compares the two. If they are the same, search continues, 
and if they are different, the click goal then clicks on the 
location where the difference was found. 
Figure 5 illustrates the process: it first attends an arbitrary 
unattended feature, in this case an oval feature in the top 
figure at location (10,10). It represents this as "Oval4", 
which in this simplified representation stands for an oval of 
a particular shape and size. The compare goal then takes 
over, and finds the matching location in the bottom picture 
(O2), and concludes that that location also contains an 
Oval4. It therefore clears the visual buffer, allowing the 
search goal to find a new feature. In the second attempt, the 
feature in location (20,15) turns out to be different, which 
allows the click goal to retrieve the operator that clicks the 
location. The model keeps track of object it has checked, so 




Figure 5. Illustration how the find-the-differences model 
operates on the picture in the top-left of the Figure. 
 
Distraction is modeled in exactly the same way as in the 
memory game: whenever the visual resource is unused (i.e., 
when it is empty, so after each comparison), the distraction 
operator can direct visual attention to the movie. However, 
the model makes an additional assumption about the 
strength of this distraction, namely that it is proportional to 
the number of yet unattended visual features on the screen. 
If there are many unattended features on the screen, the 
video spreads less activation to the distraction operator than 
when that number is low. Nyamsuren and Taatgen (2013) 
have extensively modeled this spreading activation from 
perception to declarative memory: the spreading in this 
model is based on that work.  
The model can explain the data because in the easier 
version of the task there are fewer visual objects on the 
screen, causing the movie to spread more activation to the 
distraction operator, and therefore increasing the probability 
that it is selected. 
Results 
Figure 6 shows the results of the simulation. Although the 
quantitative fit with the data is very good, it required fitting 
of the parameter that determines how much activation the 
distraction operator receives. The main quality of the model 
is therefore the ability to match the qualitative nature of the 
data.  
 
Figure 6. Model fit of the experimental data (from Fig. 4) as 
a function of task and difficulty level. Error bars indicate 1 
standard error. 
 
Although we cannot compare the performance on the 
memory task directly with the data, because we only 
partially modeled that task, we can compare performance on 

















Distractions in 15 minutes (model)
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Figure 7. Comparison of number of problems solved 
between model and data in the find-the-differences game 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
An important problem not addressed by previous models is 
how task- and non-task goals interact in producing behavior. 
This makes it hard, or impossible, to model why people 
suddenly change or give up on tasks. The example of 
distraction shows that the extension of PRIMs offers new 
options of modeling phenomena that would be hard to 
model in existing architectures. More monolithical 
approaches would probably have a hard time explaining 
why in some cases distraction increases with workload, and 
in other cases decrease with workload. In the case of a task 
that is heavy on reasoning, like the memory game, 
distraction can slip in at moments where one goal takes over 
processing from another goal, explaining why problems that 
require more of such switching are more susceptible to 
distraction. However, distraction can only intervene if it can 
latch on to resources that are currently unused. In the 
experiment, the distraction is visual, and can therefore only 
succeed if the visual resource is unused. 
There is, of course, a danger in weakening the role of the 
task goal, because we don't want it to be derailed all the 
time by distraction or irrelevant other skills. This will 
require a more robust approach to modeling. However, other 
skills are not necessarily always distractions, but can be 
beneficial for the actual task, and thereby increase 
robustness. 
In this experiment, distractions were relatively neutral: it 
didn't help nor hurt performance on the main task. However, 
in general other thought processes may be added as goals 
with slightly lower priority than the main task goals. For 
example, planning ahead is useful to do at moments that 
resources are available for such planning. A more "neutral" 
form of parallel processing may involve mind-wandering, 
which may be harmless, or may eventually turn into a self-
induced distraction, and explain why people sometimes 
suddenly decide to check their email while doing something 
that is mentally taxing. PRIMs 2.0 opens possibilities for 
investigating mental processes that we all believe are taking 
place during experiments, but that we never model. 
Another feature of PRIMs 2.0 is the option to build a 
model of a task by selecting certain existing goals that are 
connected to appropriate operators. That means that learning 
a new task involves the selection of goals, filling in certain 
specific values for those goals, and specifying a control 
strategy. A control strategy can be very simple: in our 
example here all goals were active in parallel. But in other 
cases it may be necessary to actively reinforce goals, in the 
same manner as Altmann & Gray (2008) did in their model 
of task switching.  
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